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INDIGENOUS SELF-GOVERNMENTAND THE FUTURE
OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
LORNE SOSSIN'
I. WHAT IS ABORIGINAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW?
A great deal of advocacy, adjudication, and analysis has focused on the
Aboriginal right to self-government under the Canadian Constitution.' Very
little attention, by contrast, has been devoted to what happens the day after
self-government is achieved, when the focus shifts to implementing rather
than achieving self-government. For example, will the institutions and
mechanisms of executive government in an environment ofAboriginal self-
government look similar to executive governments in other Canadian
settings (municipal, provincial, and federal)? WillAboriginal communities
be governed by an executive divided into an elected and politically
accountable leadership, and an independent and expert career public service?
Professor and Dean, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. I am grateful to John
Borrows, Douglas Sanderson, Darlene Johnson, and Janna Promislow for several
discussions over the past few years which have enriched and stimulated my thought on
these questions. I have benefited from the insights ofJimAldridge andAngela D'Eliawho
have served as counsel to the Nisga'a Lisims Government. I am also indebted to the work
of Sari Graben. The research assistance of University of Toronto studentsAJ Winterburn
and Karena Williams, and Osgoode Hall Law School students Kathrin Furniss and
Lauren Rakowski, has been invaluable. The anonymous reviewers of this article provided
constructive and helpful suggestions. Finally, I am grateful to the Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council, the Faculty of Law at the University of Toronto and the
Osgoode Hall Law School at York University, for their generous financial support of
this project.
Although in many contexts, the international language of "indigenous peoples" may be
preferable to "Aboriginal", I will refer to indigenous peoples as Aboriginal peoples,
following the language of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, intended to include
First Nations, Inuit, and Mtis peoples by this term.
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Alternately, will these communities be governed by some variation on this
liberal democratic theme, or by an entirely new political and legal system (or
by a revival of a customary political and legal system)? Will those people who
are adversely affected by administrative and regulatory decisions by
Aboriginal governments have the same recourses to the same kinds of bodies
as in the rest of the country (that is, will Aboriginal agencies, boards, and
commissions emerge as a parallel structure to the federal and provincial
agencies, boards, and commissions)?
To these questions, I offer an administrative law perspective. I leave it to
scholars ofAboriginal law to provide an Aboriginal law perspective on these
shared questions.2 In my study, I embrace John Borrows' claim that
Aboriginal law, along with the common law and civil law, are the founding
legal traditions of Canada.3 Each has an autonomous existence in Canada,
but it is fair to say that what makes Canada a distinct, if not unique project, is
the meaningful relationships between spheres of law. For example, the
founding of Canada required interaction between principles of statutory and
constitutional interpretation (and the adoption of the "living tree" approach
to Canadian federalism). The introduction of the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms4 similarly led to intermingling between common law and
fundamental rights (for example, the grafting of common law procedural
fairness as the "principles of fundamental justice" under section 7 of the
Charter).Aboriginal aw and custom have been incorporated to some extent
into the rights recognized through section 35 of the Constitution. Borrows is
most concerned in his study with constitutional traditions. In this article, I
2 For an example of a governance approach from an Aboriginal point of view, see John
Borrows, "Constitutional Law From a First Nation Perspective: Self-Government and the
Royal Proclamation" (1994) 28:1 UBC L Rev 1. For a broader discussion of the
intersection ofAboriginal and administrative law, seeJ Promislow & L Sossin, "In Search
of Aboriginal Administrative Law" in C Flood & L Sossin, eds, Administrative Law in
Context, 2d ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2012) [forthcoming].
3 John Borrows, Canada' Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University ofToronto Press,
2010) at 113-18.
4 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
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explore the development of an autonomous Aboriginal administrative law
and its relationship to Canadian administrative law, rooted in common law
rights to fair and reasonable decision making on the part of
executive officials.
The term "Aboriginal administrative law" is meant to capture the
mutually reinforcing aspects of Aboriginal and administrative legal
principles. In the context of this discussion, it is presented as a distinctive
branch of administrative law that is capable of responding to and
incorporating concepts of fairness, independence, and accountability from
Aboriginal governance contexts and institutions. Aboriginal administrative
law is discussed as a pan-Aboriginal concept, encompassing sufficient
flexibility to respond to differences in Aboriginal governance traditions and
institutions.As well, reference to the achievement of self-government might
involve "recognition" of self-government in current negotiation contexts, an
affirmation of historic self-government activities, or achieving "negotiated"
self-government that promises better recognition and implementation
within Canada.
With this context and these caveats in mind, I take the sphere of
Aboriginal administrative law to capture at least three interrelated ideas.
The first idea underlying Aboriginal administrative law relates to how
Canadian administrative law principles and doctrines should be applied in
Aboriginal settings (if at all). At first glance, the flexibility and contextual
nature of the doctrines and principles of Canadian administrative law appear
well-suited to adaptation by First Nations governance, and some of these
principles and doctrines, by inertia or by choice, already have come to define
early experiences with self-government. For example, the Nisga'a Lisim
Administrative Review Tribunal looks like many other administrative
tribunals throughout the country, as discussed below. Also, as a matter of
Canadian administrative law, Aboriginal band decision making taken
pursuant to the Indian Act5 or other statutory powers are covered by
administrative law doctrines, so in that sense, applying Canadian
administrative law to Aboriginal decision making is a long-standing feature
Indian Act, RSC 1985, c 1-5.
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of the governance of Aboriginal peoples (explored in the discussion of the
Matsqui decision below in section 2, "Independence").
Further, the hallmark of Canadian administrative law is arguably its
ability to develop approaches to questions of fairness, independence, and
accountability to apply in disparate settings within the administrative state
(for example, government departments, hospitals, prisons, universities,
regulatory agencies, and adjudicative tribunals, to name a few of
these settings).
Do Aboriginal communities present a particularly distinct administrative
setting in which to apply conventional administrative law doctrines, or do
such communities require different doctrines altogether? An understanding
of what constitutes a reasonable apprehension of bias developed in the
context of a utility board (where, for example, a member makes public
statements relating to the issue during hearings and may be perceived to have
decided the issue before hearing all of the evidence) 6 may not be applied in
the same way in the context of immigration decision making (where, for
example, an immigration officer must consider the best interests of children
in making a deportation decision and may be biased when expressing views
contrary to a child's best interest).7 Yet the same principles are held to govern
each under Canadian administrative law.
Principles of institutional independence forged in the setting of liquor
regulation8 are often applied in the setting of securities regulation.' Justice
Louis Lebel once wrote that
not all administrative bodies are the same. Indeed, this is an understatement.
At first glance, labour boards, police commissions, and milk control boards
may seem to have about as much in common as assembly lines, cops, and
cows! Administrative bodies do, of course, have some common features, but
6 See Newfoundland Telephone Company Limited v The Board of Commissioners ofPublic
Utilities, [1992] 1 SCR 623, 95 Nfld & PEIR 271 [Newfoundland cited to SCR].
7 See Bakerv Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817, 174
DLR (4th) 193 [Baker cited to SCR].
8 See Quibec Inc v Quebec (Rfgie des permis dalcool), [1996] 3 SCR 919, 140 DLR
(4th) 577.
9 See Katz v Vancouver StockExchange, [1996] 3 SCR405, 139 DLR (4th) 575.
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the diversity of their powers, mandate and structure is such that to apply
particular standards from one context to another might well be
entirely inappropriate. 1°
Is there any difference in grafting similar approaches developed through the
review of liquor and securities regulators to the governing institutions of
First Nations, or must a framework be developed that is consistent with
customs, traditions, spiritual beliefs, and historical realities of Aboriginal
peoples? In other words, a discussion of Aboriginal administrative law
necessarily engages the limits of pluralism in public law. It reveals the tension
between those features of administrative law with a claim to universality, and
those which may be reduced, ultimately, to a particular culture's view of
justice at a particular time in its history.
The second idea animating Aboriginal administrative law involves the
kinds of administrative justice which should be developed by Aboriginal
communities as they assume control over their own public institutions
through mechanisms of self-government. Consider, for example, the
analogous experience of Canada's most ambitious instance of indigenous self-
government to date-the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA)-out
of which the territory of Nunavut was established in 1999. The NLCA
specifies that the number of Inuit employed in the public service be
representative of Inuits in Nunavut society." This figure was set at 50 percent
for 1 April 1999, and was intended to slowly increase to 85 percent to reflect
the fact that Inuit comprise the overwhelming majority of Nunavut
residents. As a result of the NLCA, the government ofNunavut is unique in
its ability to make decisions in certain areas ofjurisdiction typically reserved
for the federal government in Canada's other territories. 2
1 Blencoe v British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), 2000 SCC 44 at para 158,
[2000] 2 SCR 307.
11 NunavutLand Claims AgreementAct, SC 1993, c 29, s 23.2.1.
12 For example, alongwith federal government representatives, Inuit also hold representative
positions on institutions of public government that were created by the NLCA. As a
result, Inuit appointees and Nunavut government representatives sit side by side on such
administrative bodies as the Nunavut Wildlife Management Board, Nunavut Planning
Commission, Nunavut Impact Review Board, the Nunavut Water Board, and the
2012
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Another way Aboriginal administrative law has been understood is
through Aboriginal participation on administrative bodies outside
Aboriginal communities, but whose decisions affect those communities. In
Canada, comanagement boards represent an example of this phenomenon.
Reservations about whether comanagement arrangements permit Aboriginal
values to impact decision making echo the concerns of critical legal
scholarship that transplanted legal instruments have a limited capacity for
transformative political change. Can such regulatory and administrative
settings, however, provide the space necessary for adaptation that can
transform regulation to reflect local values?
Sari Graben has explored how participatory processes have led to the
adaptation of regulatory instruments that are, for all intents and purposes, a
transplanted form of Aboriginal governance. 3 Using the case study of the
Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board, a comanagement
board in Northern Canada, she describes howAboriginal communities have
provided input into the guidelines used by the Board and the impact of this
participation. Furthermore, Graben finds those guidelines have proved
instrumental in fostering private negotiation between Indigenous
communities and industry as a central feature of environmental assessment.
The third idea relates to the relationship between Aboriginal and
Canadian systems. To take a familiar concept from administrative law, what
level of deference should apply when Aboriginal decision making is
impugned in applications for judicial review in Canadian courts? In what
circumstances should those courts overturn Aboriginal government or
agency decision making? Where Aboriginal and Canadian regulatory
jurisdictions apply to a given matter or individual, which should take
precedence and why? These areas of the convergence of Aboriginal and
Canadian administrative law principles remain largely unsettled. However,
Nunavut Surface Rights Tribunal. See Mike Vlessides, "A Public Government", online:
Nunavut 99 <http://www.nunavut.com>.
13 Sari Graben, "Writing the Rules of Socio-Economic Assessment: Adaptation Through
Participation" (Paper delivered at the annual meeting of the Law and SocietyAssociation,
Chicago (27 May 2010), Osgoode CLPE Research Paper 23/20 10.
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recent jurisprudence such as the Tlicho case 4 (discussed below in the section
"Is There an Aboriginal Model for Administrative Decision Making?")
suggests that, for at least the foreseeable future, Canadian courts will remain
a key forum for Aboriginal administrative law.
This relationship is fundamental. If Aboriginal government bodies and
agencies are designed to meet the requirements of Canadian administrative
law as regulated by judicial review through Canadian courts, those bodies
and agencies may look quite different than if those bodies and agencies are
insulated from review and given the space to develop their own approaches
to questions of procedural and substantive sufficiency.
Nowhere is the convergence ofAboriginal and Canadian administrative
law more apparent than in the area of the duty to consult and
accommodate.'" The duty is derived from the "honour of the Crown", and
where it applies, it requires the Crown to consult with Aboriginal
communities about land use where the land is associated with a claim by the
Aboriginal community. Further, it compels the Crown not just to consult
but also to accommodate Aboriginal concerns, though it leaves to the Crown
the determination of how best to do so. While the Supreme Court has
asserted that this duty is constitutional in nature, and therefore is not strictly
speaking an instance of Aboriginal administrative law, it demonstrates the
exact kind of convergence between procedural justice and distinctive
Aboriginal approaches relevant to this discussion." In the Little
Salmon/Carmacks decision, the Supreme Court highlighted this
14 Lafferty v Tlicho Government, 2009 NWTSC 35, [2009] 3 CNLR 151 [Tlicho].
15 For a broader discussion of the duty to consult and accommodate in the context of
Aboriginal administrative law, see Promislow & Sossin, supra note 2.
16 See Beckman v Little Salmon/Carmacks FirstNation, 2010 SCC 53, [2010] 3 SCR 103
[Little Salmon/Carmacks]; Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister ofForests), 2004
SCC 73, [2004] 3 SCR 511 at paras 20, 32 [Haida Nation]. For discussion, see David
Mullan, "The Duty to Consult Aboriginal Peoples--The Canadian Example" (2009)
22:2 Can J Admin L & Prac 107; and Dwight G Newman, The Duty to Consult: New
Relationships with Aboriginal Peoples (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2009). See also
Lorne Sossin, "The Duty to Consult andAccommodare: ProceduralJustice asAboriginal
Rights" (2010) 23:1 CanJ Admin L & Prac 93.
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relationship. The Court considered the argument that administrative law
principles "for all their tremendous value, are not tools toward reconciliation
of Aboriginal people and other Canadians."' 7 The Court rejected this
approach, building on the Court's original pronouncement in Haida
Nation that:
In all cases, the honour of the Crown requires that the Crown act with good
faith to provide meaningful consultation appropriate to the circumstances.
In discharging this duty, regard may be had to the procedural safeguards of
natural justice mandated by administrative law.'8
Justice Binnie noted in Little Salmon/Carmacks: "Administrative law is
flexible enough to give full weight to the constitutional interests of the First
Nation."'9 In other words, the impact of an administrative decision on the
interest of an Aboriginal community, whether or not that interest is
entrenched in a section 35 right, will help shape the scope and nature of
procedural justice applicable in this context.As the Court recently affirmed,
administrative discretion is exercised in light of constitutional guarantees
and the values they reflect.2"
Turning now to the content of Aboriginal administrative law, I seek to
explore the possible scope of this field rather than positing definitive answers
as to its boundaries. Each of the three dimensions of Aboriginal
administrative law explored below takes as its point of departure a concept
well-recognized in Canadian administrative law. I leave for another day to
consider dimensions of Aboriginal administrative law that may have no
corollary or point of reference in any other administrative law system.
II. WHAT IS (AND ISN'T) ADMINISTRATIVE LAW?
To grapple with the question of whether Aboriginal administrative law
provides a necessary or helpful legal construct, it is first necessary to
17 Little Salmon/Carmacks, supra note 16 at para 45.
18 Ibid at para 46 [emphasis in original].
'9 Ibid at para 47.
20 See Dori v Barreau du Qubec, 2012 SCC 12, 343 DLR (4th) 193.
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understand what is meant by "administrative law" more broadly. I approach
administrative law as encompassing any law, rule, principle, or practice which
governs decision making by government or an entity governed by statute (e.g.
agencies, boards, regulators, tribunals, commissions, etc.). This definition
already covers, for example, the many functions performed by Aboriginal
leaders and band councils which either exercised governmental or delegated
powers pursuant to statutes or treaties.Administrative law may swallow up so
much of public decision making that it is sometimes helpful to define it by
what it does not include: namely, decisions taken by private individuals,
organizations or entities, a legislature or court, or rules dictated by the
constitution which cannot easily be altered by the government of the day. A
narrower but more functional definition of administrative law is that it sets
out the substantive and procedural standards by which those who exercise
public authority will be held legally accountable.
What does it mean to say that a sphere of decision making is covered by
administrative law? Administrative law is concerned generally with the
legitimacy of public decision making. Administrative law in Canada, as
elsewhere, has emerged out of a particular matrix of political, legal,
economic, and social development predicated on a separation of powers
between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. At a
minimum, it governs the authority to make decisions pursuant to statutory
and prerogative powers.21 To say a matter is covered by administrative law,
generally, is to say that a person affected by a public decision has recourse to a
legal process (a court, tribunal, etc.) if that persons rights to a fair decision
have not been respected, if the decision is unreasonable, or if the decision lies
outside the decision maker's jurisdiction.
The historical development ofAboriginal communities has certainly been
markedly different from the rest of Canada. As such, one might expect the
forms and principles of administrative law to look correspondingly different
21 DavidJ Mullan, Administrative Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001) at 3-4. For an excellent,
all-encompassing introduction to administrative law, see "Chapter One: The
Administrative State and the Rule of Law" in Gus Van Harten, Gerald Heckman & David




in Aboriginal communities that attain self-government. There are many
aspects of administrative law that could explore these distinctions-I have
chosen to focus on those areas which reflect, in my view, both culturally
determined and universal features: these are concepts of (1) fairness, (2)
independence, and (3) accountability in administrative law. Each of these is
discussed briefly below.
A. FAIRNESS
Fairness, or procedural justice, in administrative law captures a range of
participatory rights organized around the requirement that those affected by
a non-legislative and potentially adverse decision have a right to be heard. It
is also a hallmark of fairness in Canadian administrative law that a decision
maker must not have a personal or private stake in the outcome ofa decision.
The current standard of impartiality and disinterestedness developed in the
late 1970s and focused on the "reasonable apprehension of bias"-what
matters is not what actually is in the heart and mind of a decision maker
(which can never be established with certainty), but rather what a reasonable
observer would conclude looking at the situation objectively. This standard is
set out, somewhat elliptically, by Justice de Grandpr , dissenting in
Committee for Justice and Liberty v Canada (National Energy Board):
[T]he apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and
right minded persons, applying themselves to the question and obtaining
thereon the required information.... [T]hat test is'what would an informed
person, viewing the matter realistically and practically-and having thought
the matter through-conclude. Would he think that it is more likely than
not that [the decision-maker], whether consciously or unconsciously, would
not decide fairly.'22
In short, according to this standard, the closer the connection a decision
maker has to the issues to be decided, or to the parties who are affected by
the decision, the more likely it is that a reasonable person would perceive
bias. Bias, though, like the whole corpus of procedural fairness, may vary
22 CommitteeforJusticeandLiberty v Canada (NationalEnergy Board), [19781 1 SCR 369
at 394,68 DLR (3d) 716.
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with context.23 The differences in First Nations' perspectives may be
intimately tied with ideas about the nature of authority: how it is
circumscribed, to whom duties of leadership are owed, and how conflicts are
to be resolved.
It has been accepted as self-evident under the common law that a decision
maker can act more fairly when having no connection to the parties affected
by the decision. 24 However, this may be a standard particularly ill-suited to
Aboriginal communities, especially ones with small populations of extended
families and a long, shared history.
I had an opportunity to explore this issue during a research trip to
Nunavut in 2003.25 Nunavut did not set out to create a series of Inuit laws;
rather, it inherited the Northwest Territories'entire legislative system, which
remains in place. This includes legislation which creates a number of
administrative boards, agencies, and commissions, such as a labour standards
board and a liquor licensing commission. Because of the small and scattered
nature of Nunavut's population, I encountered people who served multiple
roles in the territory's emerging administrative state-one person might drive
a cab, serve part-time with a regulatory commission, and have a post with a
community agency. Keeping these hats distinct over time is not possible,
even if it were desirable. Over the course of conducting interviews and
reviewing administrative decisions, I found a significant basis for the
conclusion that the perception of fairness may well be enhanced, at least in
the Inuit context, by the fact that a decision maker is likely to know those
subject to the decision. As such, the decision maker understands the social
23 See Newfoundland, supra note 6; Baker, supra note 7 at para 47.
24 See Lorne Sossin, "An Intimate Approach to Fairness, Impartiality and Reasonableness in
Administrative Law" (2002) 27:2 Queen's LJ 809; Lorne Sossin, "Public Fiduciary
Obligations, Political Trusts and the Equitable Duty of Reasonableness in Administrative
Law" (2003) 66:1 Sask L Rev 129.
25 See e.g. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, "Nunavut-September 2003", online:
Government of Canada <http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca>. This research was part of a
SSHRC-funded research project on "The Law of Public Administration in Canada".
Nunavut became Canada's third territory on 1 April 1999, following a comprehensive
land claim settlement with the Inuit of the Eastern Arctic.
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forces and individual challenges that those individuals and their families
have experienced.
In other words, many of those with whom I spoke would put it this way:
how can you be truly fair to someone you do not know? Indeed, one could
go further and identify one of the roots of the systemic discrimination of the
justice system againstAboriginal peoples as flowing from the fact that judges,
administrators, andothers makingdecisions affectingAboriginal community
life did not know the people involved. Patricia Monture has explored a
similar dynamic in the context of nepotism in community governance in
indigenous contexts. She writes,
Sometimes issues attributed to a lack of accountability actually stem from
lack of clarity about the expectations of imposed structures of governance
and law. An obvious example of the concurrent experience of conflict and
contradiction would be the frequently heard concerns about nepotism. In a
social system structured on objectivity and the distance of decision makers
from the matters under review, it is not appropriate to hire family simply
because they are family. All such hirings are at least suspicious if not wrong.
However, in a social system that is structured on family and often clan as the
primary component, decisions based on family and clan obligation and/or
responsibility become characterized as something they are not, nepotism.
This is often the outcome because the Indigenous reasons for the decision
are often not express in the hiring process. This is not a justification of
nepotism but rather a demonstration of the degree to which "culture"
conflict impacts on the analysis of good governance. 26
There is obviously a difference between cultural sensitivity to social context
and actual knowledge of a particular individual, but I would suggest this is a
difference of degree rather than kind. The very reason why many advocate for
a representative bench, or for public institutions which reflect the societies
they serve, is so that those who make decisions will have a sense of the lives of
26 Patricia A Monture, "Community Governance and Nation (Re)Building: Centering




the people those decisions affect. 27 The reasonable apprehension of bias is
directed at the openness of the decision maker's mind to a just decision.28
It is intended to ensure that decision makers acting under public
authority make decisions in the public interest and are not furthering their
private interest. Neither of these goals, however, requires that the decision-
maker and those affected by decisions be strangers to one another.
The law of bias, however, may be one of those areas which can be adapted
to Aboriginal government contexts without altering the nature of the
doctrine. If the reasonable apprehension of bias is seen through the lens of
the reasonable Aboriginal person, rather than some more abstract reasonable
person, then greater leeway may exist to infuse administrative law with the
perspectives of Aboriginal community life. That said, it remains as true in
Aboriginal contexts as governments throughout Canada that a decision
maker should not be motivated by self-gain in discharging public duties.
Thus, it is possible, and necessary in my view, to disentangle the universal
concern against bias (i.e., self-dealing) from the more culturally determined
application of that principle (e.g., decision maker and affected parties
knowing each other or having relationships with one another constituting a
reasonable apprehension of bias).
B. INDEPENDENCE
Administrative law is concerned not only with the impartiality of the
decision-maker, but also with the independence of the decision maker. While
impartiality usually refers to the mindset of the decision maker,
independence refers to the structures and conditions of decision making, and
typically captures independence from government and partisan concerns.
Here, too, the question is whether those structures and conditions give rise to
a reasonable apprehension of bias, as opposed to actual bias.
It is perhaps a coincidence, or even irony, that the leading precedent from
the Supreme Court of Canada on the meaning of independence in
27 See generally Lorne Sossin, "Discretion and the Culture of Justice" (2006) Sing JLS
at 356.
28 This point is the shared consensus of the divided Supreme Court in R v S(RD), [1997]
3 SCR 484, 161 NSR (2d) 241.
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administrative decision making arose in the context of an Aboriginal
tribunal. In Canadian Pacific Ltd v Matsqui Indian Band,29 the Court
considered the validity of an Aboriginal Band's Tax Assessment Review
Committee. The Court was split on whether the challenge should have been
raised before the committee itself before being brought to Court, but the
majority held that the committee lacked sufficient administrative
independence from Band chiefs and councils. For example, the Committee
members could be fired at any time and their compensation was left to the
discretion of the Band. In his reasons, Chief Justice Lamer observed:
[W]hile I agree that the larger context of Aboriginal self-government
informs the determination of whether the statutory appeal procedures
established by the appellants constitute an adequate alternative remedy for
the respondents, I cannot agree with SopinkaJ.'s conclusion that this context
is relevant to the question of whether the bands' tribunals give rise to a
reasonable apprehension of bias at an institutional level. In my view,
principles of natural justice apply to the bands'tribunals as they would apply
to any tribunal performing similar functions.3"
The basis of the dispute in Matsquiwas whether or not certain lands were
within the Matsqui reserve for the purposes of taxing a rail line which
Canadian Pacific Ltd hoped to build in the region. The Matsqui sent
Canadian Pacific a tax assessment, which the company then sought to have
judicially reviewed. As a result, the Matsqui brought a motion to strike the
claim, arguing that judicial review was not appropriate since the assessment
bylaws allowed for an eventual appeal in Federal Court. The motions judge
struck out the application, but this was overturned by the Federal Court of
Appeal and the Supreme Court. The majority of the Court held that the
motions judge did not consider whether the appeal tribunals were sufficiendy
independent from Band chiefs and councils, and found that in fact they were
not, thus justifying the jurisdiction of the Federal Court to hear the case as a
judicial review.
29 Canadian Pacific Ltd v Matsqui Indian Band, [1995] 1 SCR 3, 122 DLR (4th) 129




Although a minority judgment, Chief Justice Lamer's standard for
independence was the one adopted by later courts as the framework of
independence to be applied in the context of administrative adjudication (in
settings far removed from Aboriginal government decision making). After
determining that "members of the appeal tribunals perform adjudicative
functions not unlike those of courts"3' he found that "under the By-laws,
there is nothing to prevent the Band Chiefs and Councils from paying
tribunal members only after they have reached a decision in a particular case,
or not paying the members at all."32 In addition, he found that tribunal
members could be removed from their positions at any time by the bands,
which left open the possibility of "considerable abuse."33 Furthermore, the
fact that the Chiefs and Band Councils selected the members of their
tribunals contributed to the appearance ofa dependent relationship between
the tribunal and the band. As already quoted above, in coming to this
conclusion, Chief Justice Lamer did admit that "the larger context of
Aboriginal self-government informs the determination of whether the
statutory appeal procedures established by the appellants constitute an
adequate alternative remedy for the respondents."' Yet, he did not see how
this was relevant to the question of whether the bands' tribunals give rise to a
reasonable apprehension of bias at an institutional level.
In other words, the Supreme Court simply grafted the test for judicial
independence (security of tenure, financial independence, and institutional
autonomy) onto the context of administrative tribunals generally, and to an
Aboriginal dispute resolution tribunal specifically. While Justice Sopinka
argued that it was premature to evaluate the independence oftheAssessment
Review Committee because it had not yet been in operation, ChiefJustice
Lamer held that a lack of independence could be determined by simply
looking at the makeup of the Board; that is, without having to wait to see it
operate in context.
31 Ibid at para 92.
32 Ibidat para 94.
3 Ibid.
34 Ibid at para 74.
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In coming to its decision, the Court, and particularly Justice Sopinka,
made numerous references to Aboriginal self-government. Justice Sopinka
prefaced his analysis with the caveat that "[c]onditions of institutional
independence must take into account their context."35 He then stressed that a
very significant contextual factor in this case was that the purpose of the
scheme was to foster Aboriginal self-government. 6 This led him to resolve
that "before concluding that the by-laws in question do not establish band
taxation tribunals with sufficient institutional independence, they should be
interpreted in the context of the fullest knowledge of how they are applied
in practice."37
The desire for administrative decision makers to be insulated from
political manipulation has become a central motif in Canadian
administrative law. From labour boards to liquor control boards, human
rights tribunals to international trade tribunals, independence has become
one of the most common grounds on which to challenge administrative
decisions. While the Supreme Court remains perhaps divided on the extent
to which Aboriginal tribunals require modified administrative law principles
in the context of independence, the question remains whether such an ideal
resonates with Aboriginal tradition. According to John Borrows:
Aboriginal peoples need recognition of their own independent norms, and
dispute resolution mechanisms to ensure that accomplishments are
consistent with stewardships. These mechanisms need not be courts, but
they should possess an independence from band councils that would enable
them to act as a countervailing source of authority within
the community[.]3"
Ironically, well-intentioned attempts to "fix" First Nations political structures
by making them more accountable may end up doing just the opposite:
further entrenching top-down, elected, hierarchical politics that has little
35 Ibidatpara 113.
36 Ibid at para 114.
37 Ibidatpara 115.
38 John Borrows, "Stewardship and the First Nations GovernanceAct"(2003) 29:1 Queen's
LJ 103 at 121 [Borrows, "Stewardship"].
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respect for First Nations traditions of polyfunctional decision making and
dispute resolution structures. If the proposals are implemented, they may
make it even more difficult to diffuse power throughout Indian communities
in the future. What is needed, before the creation of administrative law
codes, are First Nations-designed adjudicative or dispute resolution bodies
that can independently review decisions of the executive and legislative
bodies in the band. There must be bodies that can independently articulate
legal principles of stewardship and responsibility whenever a dispute arises.39
While Borrows was not referring specifically to Matsqui, the Supreme
Court's approach seems to fit with the hierarchical politics that Borrows
discourages those in positions of political and legal authority outside the
Aboriginal context from doing. More broadly, the debate in Matsqui raises
the question ofwhich administrative law principles are culturally specific and
which are of universal application. Arguably, rules against self-dealing and
bias arise in any public decision-making process conducted under the rule of
law. Is the concern for institutional independence similarly universal? The
further development ofAboriginal administrative law would seem to present
a promising setting within which to explore this question.
C. ACCOUNTABILITY
Beyond questions of independence and the relationship between
administrative decision makers and government, administrative law is also
concerned more broadly with questions of legal accountability in
governmental decision making. Accountability can refer to a recourse for
those aggrieved by such decisions (a topic discussed above), or to a broader
legal culture of transparency, oversight, and justification (where a privacy or
access to information commission, Ombudsman orAuditor General, acts to
supervise government conduct).
Many have formed the view that Aboriginal institutions are less
accountable than those outside Aboriginal communities. This view is often
based on a lack of understanding and knowledge about how First Nations




scandal generalized across other institutions." In order to cope with these
challenges to their legitimacy, manyAboriginal institutions model themselves
on Anglo-American institutions.4' Yet, such a solution can be problematic.
John Borrows explores this issue in his response to the aborted First Nations
Governance Act, which would have required Aboriginal communities to
approve written codes for the election ofleaders, government administration,
and accountability measures. In his response, Borrows writes:
First Nations must ensure that issues of accountability are explored by
reference to their own world views and traditions. Without such
examination, 'there is a very real possibility of a mismatch between their
formal governments and the standards of political legitimacy found in
their cultures:42
Traditionally, Aboriginal ceremonies were often performed in
conjunction with creation stories to communicate to the Creator and to
acknowledge before others how one's duties and responsibilities had been
performed. This practice put in place the principle that people are
responsible for their actions and must be held accountable for the
consequences of those actions. John Borrows states:
For First Nations, to speak of accountability detached from notions of to
whom duties are owed (acknowledgement), how they should be exercised
(accomplishment), and the consequences that flow from such exercise
(approbation) is to speak of a hollow, almost meaningless concept.
Accountability is given context by its relationship to larger principles of
stewardship. It draws its significance from the fact that the Creator, the
earth, plants, animals and other beings are those to whom responsibility
flows. Accountability is thus given meaning by the knowledge one has about
how to prepare to exercise and implement this responsibility. Stewardship is
only effective when people recognize that specific consequences flow from
how duties are acknowledged and accomplished. Unfortunately, while the
specific practices proposed in the Act are appropriate and admirable, they
40 Nelljessup Newton, "Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal
Courts" (1998) 22:2Am Indian L Rev 285.
41 Ibid.
42 Borrows, "Stewardship" supra note 38 at 109-10.
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have not been contextualized within these broader notions of First Nations
stewardship. This is the case despite a clause in the FirstNations Governance
Act's preamble: 'Whereas bands, within the meaning of the Indian Act,
require effective tools of governance that can be adapted to their individual
traditions and customs.'
43
Borrows suggests that the principles underlying stewardship should be used
by First Nations to structure contemporary policy concerning Aboriginal
self-governance. He argues that First Nations must not try to examine issues
of accountability and governance without framing the concept within their
own understanding of the world. By explaining that governing structures
need to reflect the peoples they are designed to serve, he states that to speak
of accountability in terms of Aboriginal self-government detached from
notions of to whom the duties are owed, including the Canadian state
(acknowledgement), how they should be exercised (accomplishment), and
the consequences that flow from such exercises (approbation and
disapprobation), is to speak of a meaningless concept.'
Borrows criticized the proposed FirstNations GovernanceAct by pointing
out that the Act both puts Aboriginal people in charge of monitoring their
continued colonization, and gives bands far too much authority in terms of
setting up the systems of accountability. He argues that this actually further
entrenches top-down politics that have little respect for First Nations'
traditions of polyfunctional decision making and dispute resolution
techniques. Borrows explains the need for an independent court or tribunal
to play the role of an independent dispute resolution mechanism.
Additionally, he suggests that there should be both formal and informal
adjudicative mechanisms in place to deal with questions concerning the
integrity of the leaders of a community, and explains that these mechanisms
should be based on First Nations' laws and traditions relating
to stewardship.45





Borrows states that the power of Aboriginal peoples to judge and hold
their own members accountable for their actions (i.e., self-government) is an
existing Aboriginal right that is protected under subsection 35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982. He goes on to recommend that the Aboriginal
remedies of approbation and disapprobation would be more appropriate
than administrative codes in considering issues of accountability in
Aboriginal communities. Systems of accountability should be structured in
such a way that approbation (e.g., feasts, dances, songs, names) and
disapprobation (e.g., shaming feasts, loss of names, loss of property, loss of
those things over which the person formerly had stewardship, and in some
cases, removal from the community) should be attached to conduct over
which people have stewardship. The notion of approbation is different from
most administrative schemes, which tend only to demarcate and punish
wrongful behaviour, as opposed to also rewarding good behaviour.46
There are other perspectives on how the traditions and oral culture of
Aboriginal peoples could be translated into governance principles capable of
grappling with the complexities of twenty-first-century government
accountability. For example, the Institute on Governance, an Ottawa think
tank, has studied the issue of the proper relationship between Aboriginal
leaders and their staff. In "Policy Brief No. 27: Clarifying Roles ofAboriginal
Leaders and their Staff: A Model Governance Policy", the Institute has
adopted the model of complementarity: where leaders and their staffare seen
as performing overlapping roles in an interdependent and interactive
framework, rather than one of hierarchy and separation. Mutual reciprocity
and mutual respect are fundamental to such a relationship.47
To deal with potential disputesJohn Graham, who authored the Institute
on Governance study, advocates the use of various administrative
instruments based on participation by those affected by decisions and
recourse to impartial adjudicators where disputes arise. In particular, he
suggests the following mechanisms for dealing with potential disputes:
46 Ibid.
47 John Graham, 'Policy Brief No. 27: Clarifying Roles of Aboriginal Leaders and their




1. the use of policies and codes (e.g., model governance policy setting
out roles, responsibilities, expectations);
2. structures such as complaints adjudication or boards;
3. nurturing the relationship through retreats, orientation,
training, etc;
4. encouraging the involvement of citizens in decision making; and
5. other tools and approaches, such as use of technology for
polling, etc.4"
The Institute on Governance argues against giving band councillors
specific portfolios along the lines of cabinet ministers (such as health or
education) because it leads councillors to believe they are "in charge" of the
area and inevitably lock horns with program administrators. In turn, this may
result in partisan politics playing a greater role in program decision making,
as it so often does in the context of provincial and federal government action.
Distributing responsibility for portfolios may also be inconsistent with a
council acting collectively, and instead promote councillors acting
independently as ministers in a government.49 That said, the absence of
portfolios may present a challenge with respect to accountability as well,
since no individual has ownership over particular programs or the
performance of particular units.
Another common theme in Aboriginal institutions is the concept of
consensus and the accountability issues that arise in trying to bring it about.
For instance, for the Ojibway government, the object of decision making is
attaining consensus. Historically, the Ojibway government has not
maintained a separation of powers. Rather, it contains one council which
renders decisions, whether legislative, executive, or judicial. 0 This system of
government might be seen as incoherent and problematic from the
perspective of Canadian administrative law (for example, by allowing the
same people who make laws also to enforce and interpret them). From
, Ibid at 3.
49 Ibid at 7.
50 Mark D Walters, "'According to the Old Customs of Our Nation': Aboriginal Self-
Government on the Credit River Mississauga Reserve, 1826-1847" (1998) 30:1 Ottawa
LRev 1 at 12-13.
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another perspective, however, such a system could be seen as more
accountable. This is because, as Mark Walters has observed, "[t]he need for
community consensus [means] that councils [have] to be much more than
meetings of chiefs-they (are] public gatherings of the band's people, or at
least 'chiefs and principal men, at which anyone [can] speak, subject to
procedural customs and ceremonies that [give] precedence to 'age and
wisdom.'"' Compliance was ensured in this context through the use of social
pressure. Can similar mechanisms of social pressure lead to meaningful
accountability in the twenty-first century?
III. IS THERE AN ABORIGINAL MODEL FOR
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION MAKING?
While there are examples of Aboriginal approaches to fairness,
independence, and accountability, it is misleading to suggest that there is one
Aboriginal view on any of these spheres of administrative law. Another
important insight into models of Aboriginal government comes from the
contributions of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP),
which delivered a mammoth report in 1996 with scores of far-reaching
recommendations.52 RCAP devoted significant attention toAboriginal self-
government. That part of the report highlights that Aboriginal government
will look different depending not only on the band or tribe, but also
depending on the territory and population base. Thus, those Indigenous
groups which must govern both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples (e.g.
northern governments), will look very different from those whose
jurisdiction covers only an Aboriginal population. Similarly, governments in
urban areas will be much more focused on gaining control over social services
than would rural governments.
The RCAP suggested three models ofAboriginal government: the nation
government model, the public government model, and the community of
interest model. In each of these models, an Aboriginal government "would
"' Ibid at 12.
52 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, "3.1 Models ofAboriginal Government: An




have powers and authorities in respect of law making (legislative);
administration and policy making (executive); and interpretation,
application and enforcement of law (judicial)."" The legislative component
"may resemble historical structures, existing structures (a council) or
government structures common to other Canadian governments (such as a
legislative assembly)." 4 Likewise, the executive may be composed of
individuals, such as chiefs, bodies, or councils, for example. Finally, judicial
powers will most likely rest with those Aboriginals seen as providing good
"counsel and wisdom," such as elders and women." In the end, the RCAP
provides a useful point of departure, but surprisingly little in the way of
specific models that might inform Aboriginal administrative law. As with so
much in the field ofAboriginal and constitutional law, the focus has been on
achieving Aboriginal self-government, rather than what happens the
day after.
As was pointed out in the RCAP report, notions of accountability vary
not only between non-Aboriginals and Aboriginals, but amongst different
bands and tribes as well. Robert Cooter and Wolfgang Fikentscher provide
an excellent explanation of this variability in their research into tribal
courts. 56 Thus, for instance, some tribal courts have no appeals court, some
have one combined with their tribal council, some insist upon hiring judges
from outside their tribe, and still others have an appeals court that is virtually
identical to any state court in the United States. 7 In addition, the level of
control that a tribal council may have over the judges in a tribal court also
varies. For example, the Navajo Supreme Court was able to try its tribe's
former chairman for crimes that he allegedly committed. In contrast, many




56 See Robert D Cooter & Wolfgang Fikentscher, "Indian Common Law: The Role of
Custom in American Indian Tribal Courts (Parts I & II)" (1998) 46:2AmJ Comp L287.
For a more detailed look at the Navajo tribal courts in particular, see Tom Tso, "The
Process of Decision Making in Tribal Courts" (1989) 31:2 Ariz L Rev 225.
5 Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 56 at 317.
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a new chairman assumed office." In the end, Cooter and Fikentscher
conclude that the Aboriginal approach to law should be shaped by
traditional notions. That is, "law should follow culture."5 9
A good example of Aboriginal governance that reflects culture and
custom is the San Carlos Elders CulturalAdvisory Council (Elders Council)
in the United States.6" It was created by a Tribal resolution in 1993 and
"advises the Tribal Council on matters of culture, conducts consultations
with off-reservation entities regarding cultural matters, and administers the
cultural preservation activities of the Tribe. It is comprised ofelders from the
reservation's four districts and meets every two to four months."6' The Elders
Council uses its knowledge of Apache traditions and the natural world, an
important connection in Apache culture, to contribute to the governance of
the Tribe. It has been particularly concerned with the high rates of
assimilation among Apache youth, general dependence on the federal
government, the political turmoil suffered by the Apache government of the
1990s, and the Tribe's financial mismanagement that led to
economic disaster.
62
Originally, the Elders Council focused on preserving the Tribe's botanical
knowledge, but its role has expanded to providing "guidance on tribal
environmental policies ... on cultural politics.., and on guidelines for non-
" Ibid at 318.
'9 Ibid at 314.
60 For comparative background on the U.S. and Canada, see Stephen Cornell, Indigenous
Peoples, Poverty, and Self-Determination in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the
United States (Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, 2006),
online:Joint Occasional Papers on NativeAffairs <http://jopna.net>.
61 Miriam Jorgenson, "Aboriginal Governing Institutions: Connections between Research
and PolicyAdvice" (Lecture presented at University of Toronto Department ofPolitical
Science seminar series, Toronto, 12 October 2007) [unpublished]. See also M Jorgensen,
ed, Resourcesfor Nation Building: Governance, Development, and the Future ofAmerican
Indian Nations (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2007); and see especially Stephen
Cornell and Miriam Jorgensen, "Getting Things Done for the Nation: The Challenges of
Tribunal Administration" in MiriamJorgensen, ed, Rebuilding Native Nations: Strategies




tribal researchers."63 Much of the Council's work has been successful. Not
only have the Tribe's citizens responded to the Council's advice, but the
Council has also succeeded in changing the policies of the U.S. Forest
Service, and has repatriated over seventy cultural artefacts under the Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act. The Elders Council
functions by way of consensus, but maintains a coordinator and a facilitator
to aid in administrative functions. It also brings in younger members to
ensure its longevity. In respect of the Council's contribution to tribal
governance, according to Miriam Jorgenson, it "is deeply committed to
making the tribal government more responsible and accountable by giving
the traditional perspective an institutionalized and formal voice that the
politicians cannot avoid" a sort of "guidance of [the] elders."'4 The Council
has reprimanded one Tribal Council for renewing a corporate contract
without community consent and another for its financial mismanagement. It
has also striven to lead by example "operating as a self-sustaining volunteer
entity: rather than accepting tribal monies.65 How would the Supreme
Court's approach to financial independence in Matsqui apply in
this context?
Despite the success of many Aboriginal institutions at finding a balance
between Western and Aboriginal values, many of them are still seen as
lacking accountability by the justice system. With some exceptions, the
approach of Canadian courts has been to impose existing Canadian
administrative law principles on Aboriginal decision makers. The prime
example of this dynamic was the Supreme Court of Canada's judgment in
Matsqui, discussed in Part II: Independence.
It is clear that First Nations have alternative views of accountability and
how it is implemented, which from a general administrative law perspective,
seem to breach the principles of natural justice (independence of decision






change in outlook,"' particularly since the ideals behindAboriginal justice are
different from those in the administrative state; namely, the importance of
consultation with the community and of unanimity or consensus.67
One example of a cross between administrative law and Aboriginal
approaches to justice can be seen in the Nisga'a Administrative Decisions
Review Board. The Nisga'a Lisims Government is defined in Chapter 1 of
the Nisga'a FinalAgreement to mean "the government of the Nisga'a Nation
described in the Nisga'a Constitution." Chapter 11 of the Nisgaa Final
Agreement describes in some detail the powers of the Nisga'a Lisims
Government, and the relationship of those powers to those of the federal and
provincial governments. Section 16 of Chapter 11 provides that the Nisga'a
Lisims Government will create appropriate procedures for the review of
administrative decisions of Nisga'a institutions. That power has been
exercised in the establishment of the Nisga'a Administrative Decisions
Review Board, pursuant to the Nisga'a Administrative Decisions ReviewAct."
The Nisga'a Administrative Decisions Review Act sets out the authority
and process of the Board.Apart from a provision authorizing translation ofa
hearing into the Nisga'a language (though stipulating that the language of
hearings unless ordered otherwise is English),69 there appears to be little in
the legislation denoting that this tribunal is different than other tribunals
created to review executive decision making across the country.7" The Board
66 Angela R Riley, "Good (Native) Governance" (2007) 107:5 Colum L Rev 1049.
67 Lewis Henry Morgan, League oftheHo-d-no-sau-nee, orlroquois (Rochester, NY: Sage &
Brother, 1851).
68 See Nisga'Administrative Decisions ReviewAct, NLGSR 20000/4 (2008), online: Nisg'a
Lisims Government Wilp Si'Ayuukhl Nisga'a <http://nisgaalisims.ca>.
69 Ibid, s 14(2).
70 While it is common to have tribunal members recite an oath of impartiality upon
appointment, the Nisga aAdministrative Decisions ReviewAct provides that in the case of
the Nisga'aAdministrative Decisions Review Board, that oath is taken before the Council
ofElders. The oath reads: "Do you solemnly swear or affirm that you will faithfully, truly
and impartially, without fear or favour and to the best of your judgment, skill and ability,
perform the office of member of the Nisga'aAdministrative Decisions Review Board and
that you will not, except in the discharge of your duties, disclose to any person any of the
evidence or other matter brought before the Board" (ibid at 19).
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has the power to set aside a government decision complained against if it is
found to have been made beyond the jurisdiction of the decision maker,
reached unfairly, or based on an incorrect finding in law. In other words, the
Act creates a Board very much within the Canadian administrative law
tradition. Thus far, the Board has received very few complaints and has been
concerned primarily with disputes relating to elections.7' In Azak v Nisga'a
Nation,72 the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal found that the
Nisga'a Lisims Government and the Board fall under federal jurisdiction
with respect to human rights. As such, the British Columbia Human Rights
Code had no application to decisions of the Board. This case demonstrates
the complexity of not just bijuralism but also federalism, which is knit into
the fabric of Canadian and Aboriginal administrative law.
One of the important functions of Canadian administrative law is its role
in ensuring accountability of government decision makers. When considered
in the context ofAboriginal self-government, vital questions arise as to who
has the authority to monitor the accountability of Aboriginal decision
makers, and the standards against which accountability should be judged in
those circumstances. The Ojibway government, sentencing circles, and the
San Carlos Elders Council are examples of Aboriginal governance which
ground their legitimacy in distinctlyAboriginal forms of accountability. One
concern is that when those and other similarly Aboriginal institutions are
subject to administrative review, traditional principles of administrative law
will not adequately account for these alternative structures of accountability.
It is therefore relevant to look at examples of how Canadian courts have
assessed the accountability ofAboriginal decision makers and the structures
within which they operate.
An illustration of the intersection of administrative law approaches to
accountability andAboriginal self-government occurred in the Tlicho case, in
which three dissident chiefs challenged a law enacted by the Tlicho
71 This assessment is based on a conversation with Angela D'Elia and Jim Aldridge, counsel
to the Nisga'a Lisims Government, in the fall of 2009. The decisions of the Board do not
appear to be published.
72 Azak v Nisga'a Nation, 2003 BCHRT 79, [2003] BCHRTD No 75 (QL).
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government. Section 13 of the Tlicho Constitution contains a process for
challenging laws enacted by the Tlicho Assembly. The dissident chiefs who
used this process did not obtain a favourable result in their community, and
so chose to dispute the law in Canadian court. Justice Richard of the
Supreme Court of the Northwest Territories struck out their claim as an
abuse ofprocess because the claim had "already been adjudicated upon by the
process chosen by the Tlicho in developing their Constitution."73 Justice
Richard further affirmed Tlicho self-government by holding that "[t]he most
that could be said for the Applicants' position... is that there is concurrent
jurisdiction,"74 but the "[c] ourt cannot simply ignore the fact that the Tlicho
Assembly has, under the Constitution, already ruled on the validity of the
impugned law."" Overall, Justice Richard saw the Applicants' claim as
disrespectful of the newly established Tlicho self-government, 76 even going
so far as to override criticisms of the Tlicho government's accountability. For
instance, he observed that "[w]hile it may appear an anomaly to have a
legislative body... re-constitute itself into an adjudicative body (the Tlicho
assembly under section 13.3) to hear a challenge to the validity of one of its
own laws, that is the process that the Tlicho people decided upon in
adopting the Tlicho Constitution."77
The Tlicho case seems to assert the autonomy of decisions made by
Aboriginal governments, so long as adequate internal accountability exists. In
the Tlicho example, it did not matter that the accountability mechanism in
question was unique to the Aboriginal context. The Tlicho government did
not follow the separation-of-powers model popular with most Canadian
governments, but rather chose a governance structure that ensured
accountability through principles of "complementarity " This principle had
73 Tlicho, supra note 14 at para 42.
74 Ibid at para 41.
71 Ibid at para 42.
6 Ibid at para 38.
77 Ibid at para 23.
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been adopted democratically by the Tlicho people and was generally
acceptable to them."
Other cases have confirmed that the fundamental feature of an
accountable and legitimate government decision is one that is consistent with
traditional practices and is widely acceptable to the band community. In
McLeod Lake Indian Band v Chingee,79 when determining which band
election practices were customary, and therefore valid, the Federal Court
determined that "the custom of the band is the practices for selecting the
council of the band that are generally acceptable to members of the band,
upon which there is broad consensus. 8 The Court further reinforced "that it
is the Band itself, not the Band Council, that has the power to determine
what constitutes the Band's custom.""' This interpretation suggests that, at
least insofar as band election practices are concerned, the accountability of
Aboriginal decision makers and election officials is understood in relation to
the Band members and their widely held customary beliefs. Although not
explicitly stated in the court's decisions, such an approach to accountability
incorporates elements of stewardship, by recognizing the responsibility of
Band Councils in relation to both the members of the Band at large, as well
as the integrity of customs and traditions.
The difficulty with grounding accountability within notions of
stewardship is that it can often be challenging to identify the parameters of
that responsibility. Lookingonce again at the example of election procedures,
it can be difficult to determine what constitutes customary election practices,
and whether a particular procedure enjoys general consensus within the
community. This is a particularly live issue in the context of the Aboriginal
78 Interestingly, the review process took place early in the evolution of Tlicho modern self-
government, at a time where specific laws may have been open to change. Specifically, no
laws had been enacted under s 13.2 of the Tlicbo Constitution to provide for challenges to
the validity of Tlicho law, despite a constitutional mechanism for resolvingsuch disputes.
See ibid at paras 23, 38.
79 McLeodLake Indian Bandv Chingee, 153 FTR257, 165 DLR(4th) 358 (FCTD) [cited
to FTR].
80 lbid at para 17.
81 Ibid at para 13.
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tradition, which remains largely oral in nature. In an attempt to simplify
determinations of authenticity and facilitate accountability, many bands have
attempted to reduce their traditional practices to written Election Codes.
However, it is understandably difficult to capture living stories into a static
written text. Whose version of the story is legitimized, and what parts of the
story are lost? What happens when parts of the story conflict? In other
words, it is difficult to exercise stewardship when one's duties conflict.
While there is no definitive answer to such questions, foundational
principles of fairness, balance, and inclusion in Aboriginal communities may
help lay out parameters for decision making.82 Though the mechanisms
embodying such principles vary amongst First Nations peoples, their
articulation outlines community values and ultimately how some conflicts
might be resolved. Most tribes today operate under a written constitution,
such as the Cherokee Nation, who set out their governmental structure in
their constitution 200 years ago. Many have undertaken constitutional
reform to address contemporary challenges. Some Aboriginal groups, such as
the Navajo, govern pursuant to written tribal codes, while for many others
oral tradition helps define parameters.83 Of course, even oral tradition itself
may lay out lessons, rather than identifying how to resolve a particular issue.
Thus, the articulation of foundational principles in various forms help
address issues of exercising stewardship to avoid conflicting duties, though
naturally some overlap and conflicts are likely to always exist.84
When courts or other administrative bodies are called upon to make
determinations as to custom and consensus, it is important, as Borrows
stipulates, that those decision makers be able to independently articulate
notions of stewardship, and use them to identify the realities of band custom
and the will of the band's members. Non-Aboriginal courts have faced this
dilemma, and have had to rely on evidence presented by the parties to
determine the accurate content of band custom. In Nekaneet First Nation v
82 Riley, supra note 66 at 1081.
83 Ibid at 1083.
84 For a broader discussion of tribal constitutions, see Kristy Gover, Tribal Constitutionalism
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
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Oakes,5 there was disagreement as to which of two alleged customary
governance procedures was valid and generally supported by members of the
Band. Ironically, the court ruled that there was general consensus within the
Band to do away with consensus, and move to a majority-rule model, since
the Band felt that the consensus procedure had become too tainted by self-
interest. In various cases, courts have deemed a procedure generally
acceptable to members of a band if it had been originally used
without complaint.86
In some contexts, deference to band-made expressions of custom might
serve to reinforce problematic and colonially embedded power relations.An
example can be found in the context of the Indian Act and custom rules
about elections and membership. 7 In Napoleon v Garbitt,"8 members of the
Saulteau Indian Band challenged amendments to the Saulteau Indian Band
Government Law under which Council was chosen from the five founding
families according to Band custom. The Court decided that the proper
interpretation of Government Law, applying the custom of the Band, was
that for the law to be amended, appropriate notice and consultation with
citizens had to occur, and the majority of citizens had to consent to the
amendment. The case, however, brings up issues of reification of the
patriarchal family in the Saulteau First Nation, whereby only people directly
descended from five founding families are seen as authentic. 9 Even Saulteau
membership policies, passed pursuant to section 10 of the Indian Act,
discriminated against women as second-class citizens or limited their ability
85 Nekaneet First Nation v Oakes, 2009 FC 134,341 FTR 132.
86 See e.g. Bone v Sioux Valley Indian Band No 290, 107 FTR 133, [1996] 3 CNLR 54. In
this case, after a process of consultation, the Band's use of its new election code of ethics
was sufficient to prove it was generally acceptable to members of the Band, and therefore
reflected the Band's custom. However no evidence had been adduced to establish that the
community had approved the Election Regulations so those were declared invalid.
87 Val Napoleon, 'Aboriginal Discourse: Gender, Identity, and Community" in Benjaminj
Richardson, Shin Imai & Kent McNeil, eds, Indigenous PeoplesandtheLaw: Comparative
and Critical Perspectives (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009) 233.
88 Napoleon v Garbitt, [19971 BCJ No 1250 (QL).
89 Napoleon, supra note 87 at 249-51.
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to pass on Indian status to descendants. A rule under the Saulteau Indian
Nation Citizenship Act generally restricted membership to those entitled to
be members prior to the April 1985 IndianAct amendments and those born
after April 1985 to parents who were both Saulteau First Nation members."
In Sawridge v Her Majesty the Queen,9' three bands challenged
amendments to the Indian Act that reinstated Aboriginal women who lost
their status after marrying non-Aboriginal men. The bands claimed there was
a "woman-follows-man" custom, whereby female members who married non-
band members left the band. An interlocutory injunction suggested the band
custom might have been disregarded, as Justice Hugessen stated:
[W]hatever inconvenience the plaintiff may suffer by admitting 11 old ladies
to membership is nothing compared both to the damage to the public
interest in having Parliament's laws flouted and to the private interests of the
women in question who, at the present rate of progress, are unlikely ever to
benefit from a law which was adopted with people in their position
specifically in mind.92
The issue was not ultimately decided since the plaintiffs claimed
apprehension of judicial bias, amongst other claims, and closed their case
after indicating that they would not be calling any further evidence.
These examples from the case law highlight how treating the band as the
proper unit of determining band customs for elections or membership can
exclude some Aboriginals, primarily women. It also highlights the
importance of a gendered and feminist analysis in Aboriginal discourse.
Arguably, courts should not be afraid to probe more deeply where something
is announced as "custom' before accepting it as an accountable and
legitimate decision, or as representative of "Aboriginal tradition". While
administrative law should foster respect for band customs, a balance must be
'0 Others could apply for membership if one birth parent was a Saulteau First Nation
member, or for a child under 19 to be considered for adoption. The stringent criteria
included that they must speak Cree or Saulteau, be knowledgeable of customs or way of
life, have a long history of residency on the reserve, or have close community ties. See
Napoleon, supra note 87 at 250.
91 Sawridge v Her Majesty the Queen, 2008 FC 322, 319 FTR 217.
92 Sawridge Band v Canada, 2001 FCA 338 at para 8, [2002] 2 FC 346.
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found in exercising caution, particularly for Indian Act band "custom rules"
that claim to be representative ofAboriginal communities. Through seeking
this balance, Aboriginal administrative law can seek to develop a more
nuanced approach in dealing with the complexities ofAboriginal governance
and "within band" disputes.
From the above mentioned examples, it seems that courts are willing to
interpret and apply the principles of administrative law in a way which
respects and incorporates the accountability practices and traditions of
Aboriginal communities. Aboriginal practices of stewardship,
complementarity, and consensus have already been validated and upheld by
certain decisions of Canadian administrative bodies. However, there have
also been many examples in which Canadian courts have overturned or
criticized the actions of Aboriginal decision makers, despite those decision
makers having exercised their power in accordance with the procedures
established by their band. Such decisions would most commonly be
overturned for having breached one of the traditional principles of
administrative law. For example, in Martselos v Salt River Nation #195, 91 the
Salt River First Nation Council appealed a Federal Court decision allowing
the judicial review of the Council's decision to remove Martselos from office
as Chief. Martselos was removed on the basis of 21 alleged grounds,
involving contraventions of customs, their constitution, and the orderly
administration of the Band. Without evaluating the merits of the allegations,
the court found that the actual decision to remove Martselos lacked
justification, transparency, and intelligibility, and thus dismissed the
Council's appeal.
A notable example of a situation in which a court will overturn the
decision of an otherwise legitimate Aboriginal decision maker is on grounds
of bias. Interestingly enough, the courts have acknowledged the unique
circumstances ofAboriginal communities, admitting that greater flexibility is
often required when applying the test for reasonable apprehension of bias. In
Sparvier v Cowessess Indian Band (TD), it was decided that:
93 Martselos v Salt River Nation #195,2008 FCA221, 411 NR 1.
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If a rigorous test for reasonable apprehension of bias were applied, the
membership of decision-making bodies such as the Appeal Tribunal, in
bands of small populations, would constantly be challenged on grounds of
bias stemming from a connection that a member of the decision-making
body had with one or another of the potential candidates. Such a rigorous
application of principles relating to the apprehension of bias could
potentially lead to situations where the election process would be frustrated
under the weight of these assertions. Such procedural frustration could, as
stated by counsel for the respondents, be a danger to the process of
autonomous elections of band governments.94
This interpretation of bias is more consistent with the realities ofAboriginal
communities, as well as notions of fairness and independence, as discussed
earlier in this piece. However, despite this concession, there are still forms of
bias which the court will deem unacceptable. In the Sparvier case, quoted
above, a tribunal member voluntarily decided to abstain from participatingin
a vote due to his admitted bias against the applicant. The court found that
even without havingvoted, the biased member's participation in the hearing
was enough to taint the process and render it invalid.95 Bias in this sense is
understood as meaning a person having formed predetermined notions of
guilt, rather than having a connection with someone outside of the decision
making process. This was also the case in Ballantyne v Nasikapow,96 where
the decisions of an electoral officer to call a referendum and remove the
Chief from office were quashed, since she believed that the Chief was guilty
of corruption, and was not exercising her duties in an unbiased manner.
From this preliminary overview, it appears that judicial review ofAborig-
inal decisions often leads to mixed results. Decisions are sometimes over-
turned due to the decision maker's lack of accountability in the eyes of the
court, either to band membership or to band custom, while other times in-
ternal procedures are deemed adequately accountable and an attitude ofdef-
erence is apparent. While the courts do not always articulate alternate visions
94 Sparvier v Cowessess Indian Band (TD), [1993] 3 FC 142 at para 64, 63 FTR 242
[Sparvier].
95 Ibid at para 61.
96 Ballantyne v Nasikapow, [2001] 3 CNLR 47, 197 FTR 184 (FCTD).
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of accountability, such as through stewardship, there is evidence to suggest
that there is flexibility within the principles of administrative law to recog-
nize those practices. It remains unclear, however, whether the elasticity and
adaptability of Canadian administrative law are sufficient to accommodate
the evolution of Aboriginal self-government. More importantly, while it is
clear that Aboriginal decision making is subject to administrative law, we
have yet to see the extent to which administrative law will be reshaped by its
encounter with Aboriginal self-government.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has explored both empirical and normative dimensions of
Aboriginal administrative law as an idea (and an ideal). I have considered the
extent to which Aboriginal administrative law is a distinct doctrine and the
extent to which it ought to be treated as such. My approach has been
animated by a commitment to pluralism which I believe lies at the heart of
Canadian administrative law. In other words, while the principles of
administrative law are arguably universal (e.g., to ensure all public decision
making is fair and just, and does not exceed the authority of the decision
maker) the application of those principles will be and should be deeply
contextual. In the case of Aboriginal communities, core notions of fairness
themselves need to be reconsidered, such as the connection between
impartiality and the decision maker's knowledge of the party affected by
the decision.
My core claim has been that through the encounter between Aboriginal
law or custom and Canadian administrative law, each will be affected by the
other, and ideally learn from the other. Aboriginal administrative law is the
term I employ to capture the mutually reinforcing aspects ofAboriginal and
administrative legal principle. I have discussed how this mutuality may be
missed (as in Matsqui), and where it needs to be further developed (as in the
Nisga'a context).
Returning to the bijuralism approach which Borrows urges for the
development of Canada's Indigenous constitution, it is clear that Canada's
First Nations will need to (re)develop their own administrative law, and that
they will do so not in isolation but in dialogue with Canadian administrative
law. In this way, Aboriginal administrative law will come more clearly to be a
2012
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constitutive element of Canadian administrative law- both familiar to and,
I hope, distinct from Canadian administrative law as we now know it.
